On Social Deixis

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Abstract. The phenomenon of deixis has been taken to be the clearest single example of language's embeddedness in context. However, contexts explored in the study of deixis have come to be restricted to those that are phenomenally immediate, rather than those that represent the broader ideational order of society. Using data from Georgian, Mtxec, Circassian, and Welsh, I argue that there are forms of social deixis indexing perduring social relations rather than emergent situational ones. Existing phenomenological accounts of deixis are extended to provide a unified account of both situational and social deixis.

1. Introduction. Deixis, "the single most obvious way in which the relationship between language and context is reflected" (Levinson 1983:54), constituting "key points of juncture between grammar and context" (Hanks 1992:47), has for some time been taken to be the privileged site where the embeddedness of language in its social context is displayed at the grammatical level. As such, it has long been a staple topic both for research in linguistic pragmatics (e.g., Fillmore 1966, 1975; Levinson 1983) and for anthropological approaches to language (e.g., Silverstein 1976; Hanks 1990, 1992). That being said, in the current study of this phenomenon in both of these fields the key term "context" has often been interpreted implicitly as "interactional context" (the concrete speech situation), rather than "sociocultural context," so that what is said to be "contextual" about deixis is primarily what is "situational," rather than "social." Thus, the study of deixis, as with so much in these fields, has much to offer students of language in relation to microlevel interaction, but little to offer beyond the ephemeral boundaries of the speech situation. To paraphrase Goffman's famous call to arms for the study of the "neglected situation" (1964), now that the situation, once "neglected," has finally come to be treated empirically and theoretically as a "reality sui generis," there has come about a curious neglect of that which is social, however this is to be theorized. The inherent ambiguity of the term "context," the definitional counterpart to "deixis," has played a crucial role in this process, because it is in itself a "shifter" (see Goodwin andDuranti 1998:2), its meaning shifting, according to context, from "situational context" to "social context."

Therefore, it would appear that a reconsideration, both theoretical and empirical, of the context relevant for deixis is in order. My reasons for addressing this problem, and specifically for using deixis as my illustration, are not merely derived from theoretical misgivings about the triumph of situation.
over society in linguistic anthropology, but rather are motivated by a class of data in the domain of deixis that, in many important ways, does not square with the received phenomenological account of deixis. This article seeks to bring together a number of empirically attested forms of deixis that make reference to relatively perduring "social" rather than emergent "situational" relations—or, in a parallel set of transitions, purely "social" rather than "sociospatial" or "spatial" relations—under a rubric that I call "social deixis." The objective of this article is both to build a coherent and unified account of the empirically attested forms of social deixis, and to develop necessary modifications of existing phenomenologically based accounts of deixis, particularly those of Hanks (1990, 1992, 1996), needed to accommodate these phenomena.

2. Definitions of social deixis. By using the term "social deixis" in a novel way, I am making both a terminological and a substantive argument about the possible content of the term. First, the terminological argument. The term "social deixis" is, in fact, current in the linguistic pragmatic literature (Levinson 1983), and, as has been noted repeatedly before (e.g., Hanks 1992:46), what Levinson means by social deixis appears to be based on a terminological conflation of "deixis" as used by Bühler (1990:6) with Peircean ‘indexicality.’ In a Peircean semiotic, there are three possible "grounds" between the "representamen" (sign vehicle) and the "object" of the sign: ‘icons’ are signs that stand for their object by virtue of a subjective qualitative similarity between sign and object, “indexes” are those where the ground is one of objective existential contiguity or connection, and “symbols” are a class of grounds constituted by intersubjective convention or general law (see Mertz 1983:3). Note that the adjective (and substantive) "indexical" can be considered more or less equivalent to the noun "index,’ meaning "sign incorporating an index" (as in "indexical icon," or "indexical symbol").

Therefore, all deictics are indexes, but not all indexes are deictics. Following the above semiotic classification, "puro" indexes must be distinguished from deictics, which are “duplex signs” (Jakobson 1971) with both indexical and symbolic aspects, and thus can be termed "indexical symbols." One way to characterize the difference between the two is to determine whether or not there is referential (more properly, "denotational") characterization (i.e., semantic or propositional meaning) coded in the form along with indexical (i.e., pragmatic meaning). Pure (nonreferential) indexes differ from deictics (terms such as English this, that, here, there, I, and you) in that the latter are "referential indexes": “pure or nonreferential indexes [such as honorific vocabularies] . . . depend on pragmatic factors alone, and lack any referential force, while referential indexes or shifters combine semantics and pragmatics, drawing at once on referential content and social context for meaning” (Mertz 1985:6). Note that the term "denotational" is often used more or less as a synonym of "referential" to describe the semantic, rather than pragmatic (indexical) aspect
of a deictic (Silverstein 1976, 1993; Hanks 1990, 1992). Hence, deictics can also be equivalently described as “indexical, denotational” (Silverstein 1976). The types of honorific and related indexicality covered by the term “social deixis” are properly pure (nonreferential) indexes, hence should be termed “social indexes” rather than “social deixis.” However, I do believe that the term “social deixis” has a potential substantive referent, and the bulk of this article is devoted to developing this potentiality.

The account I develop the most in this article is that of Hanks (1990, 1992), which draws on both the earlier semiotic account of Peirce (1933) and the phenomenological account of Bühler (1990), as well as more generally on a broader phenomenological tradition. For Hanks, as with Peirce and Bühler, deictics have two aspects, a denotational aspect and an indexical aspect (which is further bifurcated into the “relational type” and the “origo type”): “Deictic categories encode a relation... between some referent... and the indexical context of the speech act” (Hanks 1999:28; emphasis added).1 Note that while the referent of a deictic is characterizable in terms of denotational categories that could easily characterize the referent of a nondeictic as well (e.g., number, gender, and case, to name a few such features), it is the indexical component that is unique to deictics (Agha 1996). This component is further differentiable into an “origo type” and a “relational type,” as shown in figure 1.

**Figure 1. Categories of deixis.**
Indexical "origos" are those reference points in the indexical or deictic field (e.g., speaker, addressee, moment of speaking, place of speaking) in relation to which a single token reference of a deictic is calibrated. Relational types (i.e., grammatical categories corresponding to "modes of access" [Hanks 1990, 1992]) subdivide the relation between origo and referent as being of some specific type of indexical relation, for example, "proximal to," "distal to," "visible or invisible to," "audible or inaudible to," and so on.

It is these relational types that I consider in this article. Hanks's account of relational types involves only those that are purely situational, that is, those born in and subject to revision within the situation. In this article, deixis whose indexical relational component shows this situational dependency are called "situational deixis." I argue that there exists a set of indexical relations relevant to some forms of deixis that cannot be so characterized, for example, perduring indexical relations of kinship, coreidence, religious affiliation, work or property ownership, to name a few. Such relations can only be grasped as perduring if they transcend any single situation. To bring this sort of indexical relation into the existing account requires a revision of Hanks's phenomenological account. I call this form of deixis, whose relationality is less contingent than that of situational deixis, "social deixis."

What is at stake is not merely a matter of whether or not existing accounts have noted that the interpretation of a deictic depends both on situational presuppositions of a token order (the microculture of a given interaction) and on trans-situational perduring presuppositions of a type order (a "grammar" or a "culture"). The sort of social relationality I discuss is a kind of "typified indexicality"—that is, a "typified" relationship (because it is always grasped as part of a perduring long-term relationship that can never be wholly "present") that nevertheless is founded on a real indexical basis. Such relations, though "imagined" (grasped through typification), are nevertheless not "imaginary" (i.e., they have a real indexical basis). The problem is how to accommodate an indexical (social) relationship that transcends the context of a situation, but is grasped as a long-term unity (a "relationship") in terms of a phenomenological account developed for situational indexical relationships.

My definition of social deixis is doubly grounded—opposing "social" deixis both with "spatial" deixis and with "situational" deixis—because in part it reacts to two rather different views of the "situation." There are at least two schools in the study of deixis—which I idealize here for rhetorical purposes, noting that many important exceptions exist on both sides—that assume that the context relevant for the study of deixis is the "context of situation." While these share the view that deixis is intrinsically "situational," rather than "social," they differ in their conceptualization of "context" in other important ways.

The first, characteristic of much research in linguistic pragmatics (e.g., Levinson 1983; Fillmore 1966, 1975), is based on a view of "context" that rests
or the apparent "concreteness" achieved by restricting one's focus of study to the embeddedness of language in the empirically given here-and-now of the speech event, which is viewed as showing a kind of static fixity against which variation in the utterance can be calibrated (see Goodwin and Duranti 1992:21). Since this view also tends to reduce context into a kind of asocial spatiotemporal field (i.e., a set of "spatiotemporal coordinates" [Lyons 1977:570]), in this article I emphasize a set of transitions from the "spatial" to the "social" in deixis that are mediated by spatiotemporal categories.

The second school is characteristic of much recent research in linguistic anthropology, especially that part of it influenced by ethnomethodological or conversation analytic approaches to talk-in-interaction (e.g., Goodwin and Duranti 1992; Duranti 1997), as well as to a certain extent (in a manner to be clarified below) other phenomenologically grounded traditions of the study of deixis (Bühler 1990; Hankes 1990, 1992, 1996). It similarly tends to restrict its purview to the phenomenology given, this time seeing context as a domain of almost infinite mutability and negotiability, where social life in general is found to be emergent from situated activities of talk. The members of this school are perhaps best identified by views derived from explicitly phenomenological premises and considerations, which I therefore characterize in the aggregate as "phenomenological accounts of deixis." In my critique of this school, I emphasize that the "social" consists of relatively perduring indexical relations, as opposed to the purely emergent and contingent indexical relations of the "situation."

These two schools also differ in the forms of indexical relation that they emphasize. The first view tends to treat context as the independent variable relative to talk, the dependent variable, thus emphasizing relatively presupposing indexicality, while the second view emphasizes ways in which talk, as the independent variable, can creatively shape context, the dependent variable, thus emphasizing relatively creative indexicality (for this distinction see Silverstein 1976). However, both views share a certain emphasis on the apparent empirical concreteness and immediacy of situational context over social context, in that "situated" activities, including talk, are seen as the point at which society as such is produced by empirically available local "situating" activities. The phenomenally given situation, with its seemingly self-evident concreteness of empirical immediacy, is easily opposed rhetorically in both these views to mediate abstractions such as "society." Such views, privileging the socially immediate over the mediated, are, of course, part of a broader trend in anthropology, privileging immediate, embodied experience as a more authentic social reality than the mediated abstract relations locatable in larger social totalities:

The theoretical prominence of the body is partly an effect and partly a cause of the general reductionist tendency to reject abstract categories and totalizing theoretical constructs not directly accessible to individual perception, consciousness, and participation. This means, in effect, all levels of collective social and cultural reality and historical process, and all structural constraints in absentia.
leaving only direct experience in praesentia as the domain of the authentic. [Turner 1995:144]²

The first view of context is one that emphasizes its "concreteness" (i.e., its material spatiotemporal givens), while the other is one that emphasizes the "emergent" processual quality of context. Both viewpoints, whatever their differences, reduce the context relevant to text to "situation," and both therefore seek to embed language not so much in "society" as in "situation," which can remain itself unembedded and innocent of any social totality. The first view of the relevant context for deixis as "independent variable" is explicit in Levinson's description of the phenomenon:

Essentially deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the context of utterance or speech event, and thus also concerns ways in which the interpretation of utterances depends on the analysis of that context of utterance. [1983:54; italics in original]

This view of context has come under criticism from the second camp of theorists of context, who focus instead on the negotiability and mutability of such seemingly concrete contextual "givens" (often with a concurrent focus on embodiment [e.g., Duranti 1997:321–28, Hanks 1996:248–67] that recalls Turner's comments cited above [see also Turner 1994]).² If the previous viewpoint takes the coordinates of "context of situation" to be a set of concrete and relatively immutable "givens" that serve as presupposed independent variables relative to which indexical features of utterances are calibrated, this view, instead, accents the creative reconstitution of context in and by talk, so that context becomes the "dependent variable" relative to situated talk:

Neither the physical nor the social setting for talk is something that is fixed, immutable and simply "out there." Instead these phenomena, and the very real constraints they provide, are dynamically and socially constituted by activities (talk included) of the participants which stand in a reflexive relationship to the context thus constituted. [Goodwin and Duranti 1992:7]

Under such a view, the "social" is telescoped into the "context" within whose bounds it is constituted by talk and other activities—a feature that this view shares broadly with other "situationist" or "interactionist" approaches in the social sciences, notably ethnography and conversation analysis, with which the relation is both genetic and generic.⁴ Some versions of this view imply strongly that the socially constituted aspects of this situation are always, it seems, reflexively constituted in this situation, by this talk, rather than being relatively perduring, relatively immutable condensations hailing from beyond the boundaries of the situation. Talk (including deixis) is embedded reflexively in the situation that it constitutes. Whether or not this is an intended consequence of this research agenda, we find that the main lesson of deixis is that
talk is embedded in occasions of talk. In ethnomethodological and conversation-analytic approaches, mediated abstractions such as "society" stand as dependent variables to the constituting independent variable of situated talk, without the causal sequence (seemingly) ever being reversed: "context" is treated as both the project and product of the participants' own actions and therefore as inherently locally produced and transformable at any moment" (Drew and Heritage 1992:19). This is also how I read the minor role played by the term "society" in Duranti's (1997) introductory textbook to linguistic anthropology in the following quote:

It is through repetitive, recursively linked and yet not necessarily identical communicative acts that society is reconstituted. It means that government, workplaces, families and other institutions that make up society rely on language to reproduce such institutions over time, across different territories, and despite the differences among the people who comprise them. It is inconceivable to think of any modern bureaucratic system without the specific ways of speaking, writing, and printing that guide people through its often forbidding principles and justify its existence. [Duranti 1997:337]

Such a view, which treats the social as an epiphenomenal product of the situation, threatens to move beyond mere neglect into a kind of interactional analog of methodological individualism, in which society appears as a mere "endless aggregate" of iterated situations (Jay 1984:56), "an intermittently existing composite of what can be traced back to the reality of encounters" (Goffman 1983:8). Moreover, there remains a certain voluntarism in such theories as well, which do not clearly delimit the very real limits to negotiability of context. This observation is not novel in critiques of such pure situationism and voluntarism in recent linguistic anthropology; Keane, for example, notes that

If linguistic analysis allows us to examine the interactive negotiation of authority, it should not lead us to overlook the limits of the negotiable. ... [Some such] limits are imposed by properties that cannot be discovered within the confines of spoken interaction or the temporal frame of the speech event, material and social resources can be accumulated over time. [Keane 1997:232]

The result of this general trend, in which situations are not articulated to broader social contexts, is that the study of deixis, once thought to be the clearest single way that the social embeddedness of language was displayed, appears instead to have become yet another example of the narrowness of purview associated with microsociological and phenomenological studies of language in context, with their tendencies to ignore "broader social and political contexts" (Bauman and Briggs 1990:67):

This is one of the often-cited criticisms of conversation analysis and indeed all phenomenologically-derived theories of language: They are biased toward the
experiential field of the interactants and provide little by way of analysis of the broader social backdrop. [Hanks 1996:213-14]

Given the influence of these broadly phenomenological paradigms in current linguistic anthropology, it could be argued that the situation, so far from being "neglected," has instead come to be treated as an autonomous (or, indeed, perhaps the only) "reality sui generis" (Goffman 1964), leaving society, however theorized, as the relatively neglected term of the opposition. Such an analytic bias towards the experiential field (either as the independent or dependent variable relative to "talk") can arise for various reasons, either because of its seeming concreteness (which can be rhetorically opposed to the abstractness of macrosociological categories) or because of its emergent qualities (which can stand in agentive opposition to the "structural" quality of macrosocial categories). In making this critique of these views I find myself following the most nuanced and best developed phenomenologically based account of deixis (Hanks 1990, 1992; for a broader critique of the more general trend see Turner 1985), who criticizes both spatializing views of context that emphasize the concreteness of the contextual (indexical) relations mobilized in deixis, as well as the countervailing emphasis on dextric indexicality as being purely emergent and creative:

Deixis cannot be assumed always and everywhere to be grounded in space and time in any useful objective sense. Spatial and temporal contiguity are special cases of the access that participants have (or fail to have) to each other and to objects in the world. . . . Indexicality cannot be equated with that which is inherently situated, purely emergent in action, and unstructured. [Hanks 1990:515]

Yet even Hanks's account assumes a kind of implicit reduction of the qualitative variety of indexical relations (what he calls "modes of access" in the deixic field [Hanks 1990]) mobilizable in deixis to those that are indeed "inherently situated, purely emergent in action" and otherwise highly contingent on, and susceptible to revision in, the interactional context. For example, relations or modes of access such as spatial, temporal, perceptual, or cognitive access are all ultimately dependent on, and constituted by, contingencies of the interactional context, even if not "concretely." Hanks, in fact, rather explicitly treats the field of indexical relations as being identical to Merleau-Ponty's embodied perceptual field (Hanks 1996:122). Such a view of indexicality as being "inherently situated, purely emergent in action" would seem to have an authoritative predecessor in Peirce himself, who relates his three semiotic orders (icon, index, symbol) to three temporal orders (past, present, future) as follows:

An icon has such being as belongs to past experience. It exists only as an image in the mind. An index has the being of present experience. The being of a symbol consists in the real fact that something will surely be experienced if certain conditions are satisfied. . . . [A] symbol may have an . . . index incorporated into
Deictics are thus symbols with incorporated indexes, and for Peirce, it seems, the index is contingency itself. Such a straightforward picture of deictic indexicality is rendered more complex in Hanks’s account, where the indexical component of a deictic contains two analytically separable moments, the relation and the origo. The indexical origo is limited to the set of roles created in and by the act of speaking (e.g., speaker, addressee, or the speech event itself), and therefore is in fact inherently situated and purely emergent in action. There are rather more distinct sorts of indexical relation, some of which partake of this radical context-dependence, of others of which, I suggest, do not. If Hanks has forcefully demonstrated that the relational component of deixis is not exhausted by the spatio-temporal indexical relations of context (cf. “concreteness”), it remains to add that it is also not exhausted by social indexical relations constituted in and by context (i.e., “emergent” relations that have only “the being of present experience” [Peirce 1933:360]). I argue, then, for a view of context that seeks to overcome these implied limitations, while retaining the theoretical benefits that have come from the received phenomenological treatments of the “situation.” In particular, I seek to develop a multitiered view of context, as proposed by Voloshinov:

The peculiarity of real-life utterances is that they are intertwined by a thousand threads into the non-verbal real-life context, and, when separated from it, almost entirely lose their meaning. Not to know their immediate real-life context means not to understand them. But this immediate context can be more or less broad. In our example [a conversation in a room] it is very narrow. It is determined by the purview of that room and that moment, and the utterance sounds intelligible only to the couple. But this unified purview upon which the utterance depends can broaden both in space and time. What is implied may be family, kinship, nation, class, day, years and whole epochs. The implied elements of an utterance become more and more constant in proportion to the broadening of this shared purview and the social group to which it corresponds. When the implied real purview of an utterance is narrow, when, as in our example, it coincides with the actual purview of the two people sitting in the same room and seeing the same thing, then even the most ephemeral alteration inside this purview can be implied. But given a broader purview, an utterance may be dependent only on constant stable elements of life and on essential, fundamental social evaluations. (Voloshinov 1983:12–13; italics in original)

For analytic purposes I divide Voloshinov’s implied continuum ranging from “ephemeral” to “constant,” narrow to broad purview, into a categorical dichotomy. This move is justified by Voloshinov’s own distinction, in his other work (Voloshinov 1973), between ephemeral “situation” and constant “milieu.” More-
over, this dichotomy was originally developed to deal with evaluative and expressive language, both indexical and non-indexical (Voloshinov 1973). This dichotomization is further justified analytically by the way that languages themselves formally and distributionally oppose situational deictics to social deictics. There exists a specific, empirically observable, differentially encoded, and typologically identifiable variety of deixis that depends not so much on emergent relations of context (as with situational deixis) but on the perduring social relations characteristic of, for example, domestic groups (as with social deixis). In order to capture what is interesting about this form of deixis, we, following Voloshinov, need to analytically aggregate all of the forms of ephemeral indexical relationality under the rubric of “situational deixis,” opposing those in the aggregate to a novel set of empirically attested forms of indexical relationality, which are relatively constant and perduring, here called “social deixis.” The question then becomes finding a principled way to extend the existing phenomenological account to cover these novel forms of indexicality without erasing their specific differences. In order to do this, I introduce my theoretical material in tandem with the empirical material that occasions it.

These forms of perduring indexical relationality provide me with my initial warrant for rethinking the two aspects of the embeddedness of deixis in context. First, we have here a forceful argument for dispensing with the spatio-temporal concreteness of deictic relations, for the indexical relations mobilized by the deictics under consideration move us from the spatial (e.g., actual location) to the sociospatial (e.g., residence) to the purely social (e.g., kinship). These relations lose concreteness, becoming more seemingly abstract, as they change from the ephemeral and emergent interactional relations of context to the perduring relations of society. We are dealing, then, not with ephemeral social relations constituted reflexively in and by activities proper to this situation, but rather with phenomenal condensations of a broader transcendent sociocultural totality; constant, stable, social relations that are never fully grasped but are always generated on a real indexical basis. To show how we can grasp such relations in terms similar to those in which we grasp other purely situational indexical relations, I examine in detail the most explicit phenomenological formulation of the deictic field to date, that offered by Hanks (1996, 1992, 1986).

3. Deixis and situation: the dimensions of the deictic field. Hanks’s (1990) model posits a heterogeneous “deictic field” (the term is originally from Bühler [1990]) composed of various domains, each constituted variously by qualitatively distinct modes of access (including perceptual, spatial, temporal, and cognitive dimensions). The relational types considered earlier are essentially differential linguistic encodings of these modes of access (which, it should be noted, are different qualitative forms of indexical relation). The deictic field, then, has a horizontal structure constituted by the specific modes of access “that
speaker and addressee have to the referent at the moment of utterance" (Hanks 1990:46).

The intersubjective deictic field, like other subjectively or thematically oriented phenomenal fields, has a horizontal structure defined by the conjuncture of two components. The first component is the purely indexical here-and-now relations of indeterminate quality that hold between the indexical origo and the objects in the field. I call this aspect, following the phenomenologist Gurwitsch (1964:344), "mere co-presence": it consists of actual existential (indexical) relations between the origo and its field, a community of space and time. The second component is the modes of access, which typify or "grasp" these relations as existential tokens of idealized types of relations of a determinate order, resulting in a kind of "symbolic" field. The conjuncture of these two components yields a unified context with a horizontal structure having fringes of two sorts. The first variety of "fringe" comprises copresent items of a qualitative order other than the dominant mode of access, forming a domain of "irrelevancy" (Gurwitsch 1964:344). The second variety comprises items not copresent, but of the same qualitative order as the mode of access, forming what Gurwitsch calls an "order of existence" (Gurwitsch 1964:81–83).

Context as a horizontal structure is founded on a real basis of actual existential (indexical) relations between copresent particulars, which by themselves do not form a unified context per se. These actual indexical relations are in turn transformed into a "systematized context constituted and unified with respect to specific relevancy principles" (Gurwitsch 1964:383). These "specific relevancy principles" in deixis are equivalent to Hanks's "modes of access." Each mode of access thus corresponds to an intensional (typifying, therefore symbolic in Peircean terms) relation, a specific relevancy principle that by itself defines only an order of existence. But, as Hanks (1990, 1992) makes clear, accessibility itself is crucially extensional (and therefore indexical), depending on the access that speakers and addressees actually have at the moment of utterance. In this respect, the intersubjective deictic field is analogous to other subjectively oriented phenomenal fields, as in Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the visual field:

Any sensation belongs to a certain field. To say that I have a visual field is to say that by reason of my position I have access to and an opening upon a system of beings, visible beings, that these are at the disposal of my gaze in virtue of a kind of primordial contact and it follows at the same time that it is always limited, that around what I am looking at a given moment is spread a horizon of things which are not seen, or which are even invisible. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 216)

The contingent and emergent relation of participant access mediates between the order of existence defined by a type-level (typifying or intensional) relation and the domain of mere co-presence defined by token-level (indexical or extensional) relations. Understood in this way, subjective or intersubjective access of interlocutors to referents along a specific mode of access is necessarily
contingent and emergent, while the modes of access themselves are not. Access by itself is then a simple and unalloyed pragmatic (indexical) phenomenon ("mere copresence"), innocent of qualitative distinctions. Modes of access, however, stand in a metapragmatic regimenting relationship to this indexical phenomenon, constituting access as being of this or that qualitative type. I term modes of access "metapragmatic" because they have as their object pragmatic relations (as indexical relations are necessarily matters of pragmatics). Hanks therefore improves on earlier accounts by giving a more refined and analytically powerful account of the horizontal structure of the deictic field. The deictic field consists of both indexical relations of access and typifications of these into modes of access of determinate qualitative types. As Hanks's account makes clear, perceptual access is one of the primary organizing modes of access in deixis, though it is by no means the only one.

4. Deixis, grammar, and culture. If we are to begin to disaggregate the deictic field into token level indexical relations and the typifications by which they are grasped, we must begin by distinguishing different orders of such typifications (even if these typifications themselves are analytic abstractions). First of all, we must distinguish between the relative schematic information ("sense") deriving from "grammar," and the relatively encyclopedic information deriving from what we can call a "culture," which we may wish to further disaggregate. For example, on the one hand, certain typifications are emergent from the immanent "microculture" of the interaction (the situational analog of culture), while others seem to be perdurating historical products of other relatively anonymous interactions, forming a "culture" transcending individual situations that can be invoked or presupposed to a greater or lesser extent by interactants.11

Deictics in the first instance are linguistic forms that presuppose a grammar, a Saussurean "langue" of replicating self-identical types or a Peircean order of "legisigns" (ideal conventional types) that exist by virtue of "sinsigns" (existential tokens). This is true, of course, all linguistic forms: as linguistic forms, both deictics and nondeictics have an invariant contribution to their contextualized meaning that derives from the grammar and is relatively invariant across contexts (denotational sense), and consequently is relatively schematic. Deictics, however, unlike other forms, have both a denotational and an indexical component (as we saw above), and consequently deictics encode two distinct orders of schematic information.

Deictics, in their first aspect as grammatical forms (types), distinctively encode both denotational and indexical categories grammatically. Thus a set of demonstrative pronouns (e.g., English this, that; here, there; now, then, etc.) will grammatically encode purely denotational characterizations of the referent (what Hanks [1990, 1992] calls "characterizing conditions"), in terms of being a thing, a place, or a time. The denotational component of a deictic tends to be
rather schematic, so that, for example, English here and there share that they are spaces of potentially unbounded magnitude and unknown topography. At the same time, these same items form sets ordered by opposed grammatical principles, so that the English words this, here, and now form a "proximal" set, as opposed to English that, there, and then, which form a notionally "distal" set. Such a characterization orders these terms according to the way that they typify potential interactive or pragmatic contexts of usage: the proximal set implies various schematic, specifiable sorts of indexical relations between a denotatum of a given sort and an indexical origo of a certain sort. Indexical relations can be subdivided in terms of, for example, spatial or temporal proximity, perceptual access, background knowledge, and so forth; indexical origos are the roles created in and by the act of speaking, such as speaker, addressee, and parameters of the speech event (Hanks 1990, 1992).

Both denotational and indexical aspects of the information encoded in deictic forms, as encountered empirically, tend to be highly schematic (Agha 1995), so that their token level (contextual or interactional) implementations require considerable "filling in" of the concrete content of both their denotational and indexical schemas, based on cotextual or contextual invocation of shared knowledge of a perduring, transcontextual order, a "culture":

As words and expressions are used, along with indexing their grammatical-semantic values they index also an at least theoretically independent realm of cultural schematizations—partly expressed in, and regimented by, the very medium of verbal discourse interaction, people talking about things and states-of-affairs in their universes of imagination. Such discursive and implicit knowledge of the universe is an order of information that is no less, though perhaps more, conventional than knowledge of language in its denotational—grammaticosemantic aspect. (Silverstein 1993:16)

Such cultural information can be invoked in the interpretation of a deictic in a number of ways. For example, English deictics like here (as opposed to there) do not in themselves regiment space into more than an empty schema, often merely a centered bounded space (in the most capacious sense) and an indexical origo. Such a schema must, in order to be anchored and interpreted, mobilize and indexically "center" spatial or other segmental oppositions drawn from cultural schemata that are in themselves not indexically centered, as Hanks notes:

Acts of deictic reference presuppose... prefabricated schematic divisions in space and time... The referents individuated by deictic tokens typically coincide with places already segmented by one or more extralinguistic cultural systems. (Hanks 1990:461)

An English deictic such as here, coding in itself little more than a centered, bounded space (opposed to there, denoting the residual space beyond the perimeter), whose perimeter ranges along a series of culturally segmented spaces organizable in a culturally presupposable taxonomy (i.e., a "common-sense
geography" [Scheffold 1972:702]) of such spaces (e.g., here in this room, here in this neighborhood, in this city, in this state, in this country, etc.). Of course, the taxonomic entities as mobilizable need not be spatial, temporal, or even social. In Old Georgian, the opposition between "proximad" (nco "thither") and "distad" (mi "thither") orientation can be coded on verbs and noun phrases to indicate either actual motion or figurative transition (Manning 1996), as in (1).

(1) dy-i-t-gan mo-aye-d-xode
    day-NST-from thither-day-A-towards

   'from day to (thither) day' Exod. 13:20. (Saniadze 1947–48, 1:85)

But the transition involved can be merely logical, as in (2), where the uncentered taxonomic opposition between human and animal is deictically centered as a relative "here" (humans, including stipulatively all speakers generically, including the speaker of the utterance in question) versus a relative "there" (animals, lit., 'mute' [pi-i-u-tqui 'mouth-not-speak'], whose class definitionally does not include any potential speakers). Thus, a transition (mechanical, logical, or rhetorical) from man to beast will be mi 'thither'.

(2) kac-it-gax mi-pirutqo-a-xode
     man-NST-from thither-beast-A-towards

   'from man to (thither) beast' Num. 3:13. (Abuladze et al. 1990:144)

Such an indexical centering of opposed terms in an inherently nonspatial system of "natural" categories implies that something about the category membership of the speaker (i.e., all speakers are human, so a transition from mankind to mute beast is generically "away from speaker"), and not location, is deducible, thus giving warrant for the indexical centering of an inherently uncentered taxonomic opposition. As I show, this is not an isolated example, and more generally social categories of membership (both purely social categories such as kinship and also spatially based categories of differential membership (sociospatial categories)) can also be mobilized to anchor deictic oppositions. Moreover, while the calibration of deictic perimeters to schematic cultural oppositions is a striking example, I wish to show that there are other ways in which the indexical schema of a deictic may be moored to cultural schemata, notably in terms of relational types.

The sorts of taxonomies that I have found empirically mobilized in social deixis, as I show below, tend to center first of all on varying expansion of "domestic" relations (which I treat as a conflation of relations of kinship and residence). Thus, in the first instance, we have a taxonomy of something like "home," "hometown," and on to larger geographical entities (conventionally bounded regions that are also in some sense one's larger "home"). Since in this taxonomy both of these conflated relations (kinship and residence) can be teased
apart, it follows that parasitic upon this originary set of indetical relations we find kinship taxonomies (from the founding term [coresidential family] to variously conventionalized larger kinship totallies along a single axis of kinship relationality), and similarly with the coresidential aspect. These are illustrated using the familiar example of the Nuer below, but the domestic is the single indispensable set of relations in all of the examples that I have found. Aside from these social deities that mobilize variously dimensioned taxonomic entities of the domestic variety, we find in some deistic systems alternative forms of relationality modeled on the domestic that can serve as a warrant for social deities, for example, Circassian guest-friendship, Welsh chaspi and denominational membership, and increasingly attenuated forms such as nineteenth-century liberal conceptions of "entrepreneurial" property ownership (see below). But it is clear, primarily from metalinguistic judgments of native speakers, that these latter forms are in some sense derivatives of the central domestic (kinship and coresidence) relational nexus.

As this implies, the transition from spatial to social uses of a deistic is often ambiguous. As an example, the proximal-distal opposition (literal or figurative motion "hither"-"thither") in Old Georgian discussed above under normal circumstances, with verbs of denoted or implied motion, implies physical motion of an object in direct spatial relation to the ego. The proximal mo 'hither' is found obligatorily in Old Georgian when the motion is specifically towards the current position of the speaker, and this is encoded on the verb, as, for example, when the speaker is the dative argument of a ditransitive as in (3) and (4).

(3) monel-mar, mow-m-e-n-0 me igi-ni (Old Georgian)
who-SEG hither-me-give-them-PAST me them-INT.
'He who gave them (hither) to me.' John 10:29. (Blake and Briere 1945:530)

(4) xuw-i kusht-i mow-n-e: me five-N talent-N hither-me-you.gave me
(Old Georgian)
'You gave me (hither)fivetalent.' Matt. 25:23. (Blake 1933:141)

In a parallel fashion, the distal mi 'thither' is only obligatory in Old Georgian when the action is specifically away from the speaker (as when the speaker is the subject of a ditransitive verb), as in (5) and (6). When the dative is the second person, Old Georgian very early begins to show variation (for details, see Manuaing 1996).

(5) me mi-v-ece mat siqua-y sen-i (Old Georgian)
I thither-you.gave them-E.PL word-N you-N
'I gave (thither) them your word.' John 17:14. (Blake and Briere 1945:572)

(6) see qwe-i mi-g-ece sen (Old Georgian)
this.N all-N thither-you-I.gave you
'All this I will give (thither) to you.' Matt. 4:9. (Blake 1953:23)
Here the indexical directionality is anchored in an unmediated fashion to an egocentric origo (by virtue of it being specifically and differentially coded in the clausal context), where, in the simplest case *mo ‘hither’ is found obligatorily where the action is directed from non-speaker towards speaker, and *mi ‘thither’ is found obligatorily where the action is directed from speaker towards non-speaker (for more details, see Manning 1996). Here we have a case of indexical directionality caught up in the contingencies of the situation of utterance, and more specifically regimented by the presence of a specifically encoded origo (speaker) as verbal argument (either as indirect object or subject), and no appeal to perduing extra-situational taxonomic oppositions is required to anchor the bounded egocentric space with regard to which this deictic is calibrated. Where there is no first person origo in either of these positions (subject or dative), there is variation, but a second person origo shows strong tendencies to behave like a first person in the absence of the latter. The variation here is dynamic, and in Modern Georgian the second person and the first person both require *mo when dative (for more details, see Manning 1996).

In all of the above cases the deictic is determined by grammatically encoded situational factors (specifically contextually encoded origos in specific argument positions). In the absence of any specifically coded situational origo (first or second person) as verbal argument (subject or dative), the indexical directionality must be anchored in terms of some more perduing, culturally given, schematic division. In place of boundaries in and of the speech situation (as, for example, ‘towards’ or ‘away from’ the egocentric space of the speaker), some other geographic or membership boundary must be provided (Manning 1996). In practical terms, this will mean that with the verb *mocemz, *mocemz ‘give’, in those cases where neither the subject nor the recipient is first or second person (which would invoke schematic divisions proper to the speech event, automatically “trump” all other coding possibilities), other, trans situational schematic categories can be mobilized. This deictic system may then mobilize one of a wide array of essentially extra-linguistic spatial or social segmental schemata in order to anchor such an “expanded” frame of reference. For example, as most of our texts from the Old Georgian period are religious, we find numerous examples of gifts being transmitted from a philanthropic deity to earth-dwellers. In many texts, this is the single most robust environment for unexpected cases of *mo (proximad ‘hither’) (Manning 1996). In essence, when God gives something to his people (individually or in the aggregate), we find *mo, proximad ‘hither’, as shown in (7). Any other trajectory involves *mi, distad ‘thither’, as shown in (3).

(7) da upal-mon mo-e-ca madi-i er-ss tua-sa (Old Georgian) and lord-NEG hiter-them ne gave thanks-N people-O own-D

‘And the Lord gave (hither) thanks to his people.’ Exodus 12:36. (Samidze 1947–48, 1. 84)
A similar mobilization of perduiring cultural schemata is found in examples such as (9) and (10), where gifts from the king of the Armenians to the king of the Kartli(Georgia) (the group to which a Georgian speaker would typically belong) move from “there” to “here,” with a proximal mo ‘thither’ as shown in (9). Gifts from a Kartlian personage to the king of the Ossetians move from “here” to “there,” with the distad ni ‘thither’ as shown in (10). The situation here is similar to that in (7) and (8); at a specific level of contrast in a geographical folk taxonomy we find contrast sets that oppose taxonomically coordinate regions such as Kartli and Armenia, Kartli and Ossetia, or Kartli and Persia. These geographical categories can also be interpreted as membership categories, such that Kartlians oppose Armenians, Ossetians, and Persians. They are thus “socio-spatial” categories. The speaker of the utterance can therefore “center” these intrinsically uncentered categories using these deictics ("We, Kartlians [‘here’], as opposed to those Persians [‘there’], “Our king [‘here’] as opposed to their king [‘there’]"). Presuppositional extralinguistic cultural schemata such as these supply the nature of the perimeter and also the “centering” indexically of Kartli as a “here” relative to the “there” of Armenia, Ossetia, Persia, and so forth. The dyastic realms ruled by these personages have at best problematic spatial extension and boundedness, and certainly the deictics in this situation are not meant to tell us anything about the actual relative location of these figures. 

(9) mo-s-ca nameda mepe-maqs astul-i (Old Georgian)

thither,mo-he gave Armenian-GR, king-ERG daughter-N

‘The king of the Armenians gave (him) (thither) his daughter as a wife.’ Kartlis Cxourbari 1:23,1 (Qauziçvilu 1955:32)

(10) parnava mi-o-ca
ds-ya twis-i ous-ta (Old Georgian)

Parzavaz thither,mo-he gave sister-N own-N Ossetian-GR

mepe-ta col-ad

king-D wife-A

‘Parnava gave his sister (thither) to the king of the Ossetians as a wife.’ Kartlis Cxourbari 1:24,2 (Qauziçvilu 1955:24)

The trajectory of the gift in each case crosses a segmental opposition of a folk geography, such as the opposition between heaven and earth, or the opposition
between Ossetia or Persia and Kartli. In each case, insofar as this seemingly spatial opposition is deduced from the identity of the giver and the receiver (God and his people, the king of Ossetia and the king of Kartli), it is at once a social opposition, implying a membership grouping into which the speaker is or is not to be categorized. The speaker also allows us to deduce that these oppositions are indexically centered, such that heaven and God are “there,” and his people and earth are “here.” Similarly, Ossetia and Persia, and their people and kings, are a “there” opposed to the presumed “here” of Kartli and its kings.

5. Deixis and society: kinship and residential deixis. Such culturally given taxonomies of intensionally (at the ideal or type level) discrete-spatial and social oppositions are routinely conflated extensionally (at the token level) in various forms of social organization, notably domestic groups. Domestic groups involve a complex nexus of relatively perduring (as opposed to relatively ephemeral) relations that can be separately intensionalized as being variously merely spatial, sociospatial (residence) or purely social (kinship). The domestic as a sociospatial category arises crucially from the systematic conflation of social principles of kinship relation (families) and sociospatial principles of residential locality (households), mediated by material, spatial structures (houses), in lived cultural systems themselves:

Our anthropological concepts of household and family are not in opposition; they do not define separate realms of discourse. Family (for which the primary reference is kinship) and household (where the primary reference is locality) not only belong to the same universe, they are mutually constituting, with the house itself often serving as the mediating element. It is most often the house that permits us to define households; it is the indispensable reproductive and social reproductive role of family that makes such a definition worthwhile. The two concepts are not congruent nor interchangeable, but they are, at every level beyond the merely anecdotal, absolutely inseparable. They are not alternative mechanisms for the classification of social life. [Birdwell-Pheasant and Lawrence-Zúñiga 1999:3]

To be more specific, as a result of ideal or real isomorphism between purely social categories, such as the family (however constituted), and purely spatial ones, such as the house (however constructed), mediated by normative expectations about residence patterns, such as the typical coresidential household consisting of “a family under one roof,” there comes about a kind of stereotypical (at the intensional or type level [Putnam 1975]) or prototypical (in terms of typical extensional overlaps at the token level [Rosch 1978]) conflation of these coexisting, logically separable, modalities of classification (Rendell 1967:495). Domesticity is the category where we find this blending of social and spatial accomplished most obviously.

The home is a “locale” where the physical form of the dwelling, its external and internal design and contents both reflect social interactions and social forces.
and also condition and compose them, bleeding the "spatial" and the "social" into as indivisible whole. [Williams 1987:453]

This "blending" of "social" and "spatial" is most commonly mediated by intensional conflation (stereotypically) or extensional coincidence (prototypically) of the social and spatial categories in residential patterns (see Bender 1967; Yanigasako 1979; Harris 1982), but can also be extended to such spaces that define membership groupings, such as the relation between a chapel and its membership, or a place of work and its workers (in a manner discussed below). The categories of domesticity, of course, are in the first instance cultural typifications of the normative relations between coresidence and kinship. Such schematic cultural knowledge is mobilized in doxias in two rather different ways, to fill in either (a) the "denotational schema" of the deictic or (b) the (relational) portion of the "indexical schema" (Agha 1996). In the first case, it merely anchors the perimeters of deictics, such as the changing perimeter of English here versus there, to spatial, temporal, or social segments in a "folk taxonomy." Such "anchoring" fills in the missing content of the denotational (as opposed to indexical) aspect of the deictic schema—thus the shifting outer perimeters of an indexically anchored sociospatial term like English home, anchored in relations of taxonomic opposition within a "commonense geography" or similar taxonomy of sociospatial terms. The classic example of this is found in Evans-Pritchard's discussion of the "structural relativity" of the equivalent Nuer term cieng:

Cieng means 'home', but its precise significance varies with the situation in which it is spoken. If one meets an Englishman in Germany and asks him where his home is, he may reply that it is England. If one meets the same man in London and asks him the same question, he will tell one that his home is in Oxfordshire, whereas if one meets him in that county he will tell one the name of the town or village in which he lives. If questioned in his town and village he will mention his particular street, and if questioned in his street he will indicate his house. So it is with the Nuer. A Nuer met outside Nuerland says that his home is cieng Nath, Nuerland. He may also refer to his tribal country as his cieng... if one asks him in his tribe what is his cieng, he will name his village or tribal section according to the context... If asked in his village he will mention the name of his hamlet or indicate his homestead or the end of the village in which his homestead is situated. [Evans-Pritchard 1940:136]

Our term home, like Nuer cieng, can attach its perimeters to various dimensioned taxonomic segmentals ranged along a continuum of the same order of relation (thus, all of the above are sociospatial categories of residence). Herzfeld's discussion of "group shifters" or "ethnic shifters" (Herzfeld 1987, 1997; owing originally to Galzy 1982) are precisely shifters of this kind, what we can call "segmentary shifters" (see Herzfeld 1987:154–56; Gal 1991:446). What is shifting here is the deictic's denotational aspect (the "outer perimeter")
of the deictic that shows a kind of "structural relativity") and not the indexical aspect (as, e.g., in pronominal "shifters," such as English I and you).

However, it is possible for "shifters" to vary not in terms of the perimeter (therefore in terms of the denotational schema of the deictic), as in segmentary shifters, but to vary in the actual indexical relation involved (therefore in terms of the indexical schema of the deictic), as we find in the example of domestic deixis, wherein a deictic category used initially for a spatial or sociospatial indexical relation (residence) ends up being used for a relation without any concrete or necessary spatial correlate (kinship). As we have noted, what differs in such extension from sociospatial (residence) to purely social (kinship) is the qualitative order of indexical relation. Of course, both can vary at the same time, as a qualitatively different indexical relation may also be more inclusive, as Herzfeld notes of the Rhodian use of the translational equivalent of 'here' as ethnic shifter that can refer indifferently to either "the moral or the physical community: 'here' is itself a shifter and can convey both the local community (village or district or region) and the larger community of Greek Orthodoxy" (Herzfeld 1987:50).

Turning once again to our Nuer example, we have seen how the extension of the sociospatial usage of the Nuer term cieng shows structural relativity (along its denotational aspect), an ability to expand or contract ranging along a continuum of differently sized sociospatial categories of the same order of relation (residence). However, since residence is often expressed in the idiom of kinship, and, indeed, the qualitatively discrete indexical relations of residence and kinship are empirically conflated in these sociospatial concepts both ideally and "on the ground," it comes about that the term cieng can express not only different entities varying in their extension (perimeter) along the same order of indexical relation (e.g., residence) but also it can be ambiguous as to the order of indexical relation to be expressed (lineage or residence):

A lineage . . . becomes identified in speech with the territory it occupies; the district occupied by the major lineage of wangbac, for example, being known as cieng wangbac. A Nuer then talks about the local community and the lineage which is its political nucleus in interchangeable terms. He even speaks of cieng wangbac when he means the wangbac lineage. . . . Here we find exemplified the assimilation of community ties to lineage structure, the expression of territorial affiliation in a lineage idiom, and the expression of lineage affiliation in terms of territorial attachment. . . . [Evans-Pritchard 1940:204–5]

The conflation of these two qualitatively distinct indexical relations of coreidence and kinship, variously achieved, leads to some of the familiar ambiguity of terms like English home. But, turning now to other deictics, what of these very indexical relations, "coreidence" and "kinship"? In these cases, unlike with more canonical examples found in the study of deixis, the indexical relation between referent and origo is itself a perduring relation transcending context (of situation), rather than an emergent one immanent in (constituted in and subject
to revision in) the speech situation. Such indexical relations that transcend contingencies and relations generated in the context of situation can only be constituted by real perduing social relations as typified or grasped by a cultural schematic of such relations.

Unlike emergent indexical relations, perduing inaexical relations are not contingent on the relative spatial location of referent and origo at the moment of speaking, or, indeed, on any other immediate and emergent parameter of the interactive context (background knowledge or perceptual access), but depend on some more mediate and perduing social relationship between the two, locatable in a social totality beyond the immediate context. Such perduing indexical relations are typified and valorized in various ways in terms of schematic "types" of social relations, and these schematic typifications are artifacts of a sociocultural, rather than contextual or grammatical, order. For such forms of deixis, the term "social deixis" would naturally suggest itself, were it not already in use to refer to various sorts of "nonreferential indexicality" (Silverstein 1976) by which interlocutors index various aspects of their social relationship.

In what follows I deal, in turn, with three salient aspects of this social deixis, taking as my point of departure the more specific types of domestic deixis. First of all, the indexical relations of domestic deixis are relatively perduing, rather than purely emergent in context, illustrated by a discussion of the phenomenon of "home base" deixis in Mixtec. Secondly, the empirical conflation of analytically separable social relations in domesticity helps to mediate between spatial and social deixis, illustrated by domestic deixis in Circassian and Abaza. Lastly, though domestic deixis forms the founding core group upon which other forms of social deixis are modeled, Welsh data show that the sociocultural categories of domesticity do not exhaust the possibilities of social deixis. At each point, the received phenomenological account of deixis is revised in its own terms to accommodate the new data.

6. Home base: coming and coming home in Diuxi Mixtec. Empirically, the category of "home base" (Levinson 1983:84) would appear to be a candidate phenomenon illustrating a kind of indexical relation that is relatively perduing, relatively independent of context, but that nevertheless presupposes an indexical origo that is radically contingent on the context of utterance. Levinson (1983:84) discusses this phenomenon under the rubric of "normative location" as opposed to "actual location." Home base in the Mixtecian literature is a verbal category in terms of which verbs of motion are subcategorized in terms of "motion towards base" and "motion away from base" in addition to the orthogonal indexical category of motion towards or away from the 'place of the locutionary act,' which I gloss as 'hither' and 'thither,' as illustrated with the partial paradigm from Diuxi Mixtec in table 1.
Table 1. Dzux Mixtec Verbs of Motion and Arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'hither'</th>
<th>MOTION</th>
<th>TO BASE</th>
<th>TO NONBASE</th>
<th>ARRIVAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'thither'</td>
<td>ndisión</td>
<td>núsí</td>
<td>nuí'ú</td>
<td>násí</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE**: Kuiper and Merrifield (1975:32–33).

The "base" category also allows expansions of perimeter grounded in cultural schemata:

It is sufficient to think of "base" as the place to which the Agent of an action returns at the end of a day or at the end of a trip—his home, his hometown, his home district, etc.—the size and precise location in space of the Base being a function of the order of magnitude of the trip in question. [Kuiper and Merrifield 1975:12]

As Macaulay (1982:423–24) points out for Chalcatongo Mixtec, the relation of "where one lives" is insufficient to account for all the sorts of places that can be base for a given speaker, and sometimes a somewhat broader definition is required (as, for instance, a school as an alternate base for a school age child, not because he lives there, but because he spends most of his time there" (Macaulay 1982:424). Macaulay, building on a suggestion of Kuiper and Merrifield (1975), proposes that "iteration" is a component to this category, since a "base" is a place to which one normally returns at the end of a cyclic journey.

Kuiper and Merrifield point out that the notion "base" is probably related to the more general idea of repetition of action in Mixtec. The language has a particle /na-/, which, when prefixed to certain verb stems, indicates such repetition, or an extension of the idea of repetition. . .. The data which I have on Chalcatongo Mixtec would seem to support the conclusion that the phenomena are related, especially in light of the fact that base . . . seems to be a more generalized notion than in Dzux Mixtec . . . This more general use of the concept base supports the hypothesis that it is an extension of the idea of repetition of action. [Macaulay 1982:423–24]

The fact that this "perdurant" indexical category of "base" is encoded differentially to more standard "emergent" modalities of indexical relationship in these languages reveals that it is at least analytically separable in those languages where all such relations are conflated, such as English. Whatever this relatively perduring indexical relation is, it is nevertheless clear that the indexical origins in both "actual location" and "normative location" are drawn from the same set (in this case, the speaker). Thus, it is to be emphasized that indexical relations (grasped as modes of access) may be relatively contingent or relatively perduring, while indexical origins will always be radically context dependent.
7. From situation to society: umwelt and mitwelt deixis. At this point, we return to our phenomenological account to see what revisions these data occasion. An indexical relation of "normative location," unlike the relation of "actual location," is perduing and is not typically subject to revision within the boundaries of the interactional context. The relationship, furthermore, between interlocutor and referent is itself not so much constituted by any spatial disposition, but rather by social relationships of various sorts—hence my use of the term "social deixis" for these phenomena. What is interesting about this mode of access is that the "field" defined by the relationship of normative location, while not subject to the contingencies of the emergent microculture of the interaction in which it is used, is highly illuminating of the perduing categories of habitual social interaction that lie at least partially beyond the interactional context. While other forms of deixis have an intrinsically dynamic relationship to the immediate context, this "base" form of deixis is curiously static in this regard. By using this deixic category, interactants not so much creatively align themselves to the emergent and dynamic situation as make trans-situational perduing statuses immanent in this situation. Relations warranting the use of this deixis will rarely undergo any significant revision in the course of any specific interaction or even a series of them, in sharp contrast to relations in the perceptual field, in which such realignments are the norm.

As we have seen, the indexical field of context is typically understood to be founded on the presence or absence of actual existential relations between the field and its origo. Context in this sense represents a "community of space and time" (Schütz 1964:30) between not only interactants but also their surroundings. Even items referred to as "absent" from this spatiotemporal community have a determinate indexical relation of this sort, the negation of a relation. The indexical field, anchored by the bodies of the interactants (Schütz 1962:205, 315), defines a perceptual field of "perceived and perceptible objects." Such a subjective universe becomes intersubjective in the context of a direct face-to-face interaction. What Schütz calls the umwelt. It is this intersubjective, face-to-face "community of space and time" that defines what we typically think of as context as opposed to a wider unity of community of time alone, the anomalous world of mere contemporaries, which Schütz calls the mitwelt:

Among my contemporaries are some with whom I share, as long as the relation lasts, not only a community of time but also of space. We shall... call such contemporaries "consociates" and the relation prevailing among them a "face-to-face" relationship. ... Sharing a community of space implies that a certain sector of the outer world is equally within reach of each partner, and contains objects of common interest and relevance. (Schütz 1962:5)

What Schütz calls the umwelt is evidently more or less identical to "context" in the sense of the "context of situation" (Malinowski 1923) or "speech situation" (e.g., Mertz 1985:10), or "social situation" (Goffman 1964), as opposed to the
mitwelt of "sociocultural context" (Mertz 1985:10). The opposition also parallels Cicourel's differentiation of "context" in a "narrow sense" of "locally organized and negotiated interaction," as opposed to broader "contexts" including, for example, the "institutionalized context" (Cicourel 1992:294–95). It is this identification of umwelt as the set of "spatial and temporal relations to the world around us" including both "material objects" and "other live bodies" that is found in Duranti (1997:21). Similarly, Hanks adopts the seemingly equivalent concept of "phenomenal field" from Merleau-Ponty as a basis for theorizing the sphere of contiguity for indexical relations" (Hanks 1995:122). Once again, in both theories phenomenal immediacy (umwelt) and indexicality are brought into alignment.

If we are to define fields of indexical relations in terms of pure actuality (or "fields of accessibility" [Schütz 1962:134] based on direct modes of access), then it is with reference to the fugitive field of the directly experienced umwelt that they must be sought. The umwelt is grounded in the mutuality of the perceptual fields ("the world within my reach") of the interactants, producing a "world within my and his common reach" (Schütz 1962:225 n. 14).11

These combined "fields of accessibility" are radically contingent, and Schütz often uses deictics to illustrate this (Schütz 1952:224–25, 306–7, 322–23). For Bühler, too, the deictic field, in which the fulfillment of the meaning of deictics is achieved, is grounded in the perceptual field:

The fulfillment of the meaning of deictic words is connected to sensory deictic clues. . . . What we describe as the deictic field is the core, the favored technique of speech about perceptual things. [Bühler 1990:94–95]

The indexical relations of the umwelt are completely transitory, fugitive and contingent, and thus constantly subject to revision and negotiation. So too is the purely formal relation of "consciate," which is generated within the face-to-face relation of the umwelt. Once persons cease to be consciates in the direct relationship of the umwelt, they become merely contemporaries in the indirect and anonymous relations of the mitwelt. The question now confronting us is how to characterize diffuse indexical relations between persons and objects that transcend the direct contextual relations of the umwelt, but yet are somehow less diffuse and anonymous than the relations of the mitwelt. The relationship of base, which I wish to characterize as having some sort of indexical relation as its real basis, does not receive a criterion for characterization in this dichotomous opposition, but, as Schütz notes "these are polar concepts between which exist many concrete transitional forms" (1954:37). He means that there are perduring social relations founded on a concrete basis of iterated face-to-face (umwelt) relations, which both precede the present relation (whether "consciate" or "contemporary") and are referred to as "restorable" in the future (cf Goffman 1983:13–14):
Customarily we consider marriage or friendship as predominantly face-to-face relations that contain experiences of a high degree of directness. . . . Closer scrutiny resolves the pretend ed unity of a marriage or a friendship into a manifold sequence of situations. In some of these situations, “marriage” or “friendship” was a face-to-face social relation, in others it was a social relation between mere contemporaries. Taking the terms in their precise sense, these social relations are indeed not continuous—but they are recurrent. [Schütz 1964:39]

Such relations differ from the pure “contemporary” relation in that they are constituted at least partially by preceding direct (umwelt) experiences, experiences that possibly are referred to as restorable to direct umwelt experiences even as they are experienced as indirect mitwelt experiences. Such “impure” relations are formally composed polythetically as iterations of pure umwelt experiences, which are direct and familiar, interrupted by pure mitwelt experiences, which are idealized and anonymous. Even so, they are grasped monothetically as continuous, perduring, impure experiences of “relation” of a specific qualitative type (e.g., “marriage,” “friendship”). Such relations as nodes of access are clearly not the immediate and direct forms of access that have been seen to be canonical in the received accounts of deixis. Rather, they are founded on idealization as much as existential relation, projected restorability of access as much as actuality of access. Hence they stand as “impure” modes of access over and against those modes of access that simply grasp and categorize unproblematically immediate indexical relations.

Returning to the problem of “base,” I wish to keep a sharp analytic boundary between perduring indexical relations, which are constituted in part on a real indexical basis, in part by idealizations and typifications of a more or less anonymous nature, and those contingent indexical relations that are generated entirely in the community of space and time of the umwelt. Such a distinction proves analytically useful in disaggregating contingent and perduring indexical relations as differentially encoded in Mixtec deictic systems. In these languages, certain verbs encode a category of contingent indexicality, motion towards or away from the speaker, translatable as “coming” and “going.” Such relations are unproblematically founded in the domain of experience we have called the umwelt. But, more importantly, these languages also encode separately whether the direction of the verb is towards or away from the speaker’s “base,” his home, hometown, and so on, all perduring indexical relations of “belonging.” The analytic problem addressed here has simply been to characterize in what sense these perduring relations can be described in terms of indexicality. We have seen that this impure relation can be grasped as an iteration of pure umwelt relations, guided by idealizations of restorability, and so forth. If this is so, then it becomes clear why the category in Mixtec is ultimately derived from a category that marks iteration and repetition, and not merely, as Levinson suggests, “normative location” (1983:84). The “indexical schemata” of the two categories share a the specification of indexical origo type, which as usual
remains completely dependent on the context of situation, but differ in the relation or associated mode of access. In the first case, the mode of access grasps a pure monothetic indexical relation of immediate access in the umwelten; in the second, the mode of access grasps an iterated, polythetic relation of "resorable access" (based on iterations of direct umwelten experiences and idealizations of their future restorability) monothetically as an impure continuous relation of "belonging."

But our analysis up to this point has been abstracted from social relations as they are grasped and lived: relations are never grasped or lived as merely "contingent" or "perduring"; they are contingent or perduring relations of a determinate kind. We find not "social (mitumwelten) deixis" opposed as such to "situational (umwelten) deixis," but rather various forms of social deixis, of which the most important are grouped under the cover term "domestic deixis."

8. From spatial to social in domestic deixis: Circassian and Abaza. In the Northwest Caucasian languages, Abaza and Circassian, we find that verbal indexical categories of proximad ("hither") and distad ("thither") motion and orientation can have both emergent and perduring calibrations. In the former case, they are, in the presence of specifically and differentially coded first or second person arguments in certain verbal argument positions (as in Old Georgian), oriented to the relative disposition of the participants of the speech event in relatively concrete, contingent situational terms. In the latter, in the absence of such specifically and differentially coded first or second person arguments, they are instead potentially oriented to somewhat more abstract, perduring social relations of kinship and coresidence. In Abaza, the verbal system has two opposed deictic directionals: fa (proximad, motion, or orientation "hither", parallel to Circassian qa) and na/θ (distad, "thither"). The proximad is required only when the notional goal of motion or action is the first person, and the distad is required when the notional source of motion or action is the first person. However, when the first person is not involved as source or goal, we may use the proximad or the distad.

In cases involving the proximad, the parenthetical glosses that Allen (1956) gives for his Abaza examples, reproduced in (11) and (12), identify the actor at notional "source" and the actor at "goal" as being members of separate segmental social or sociospatial groupings (kinship group, household, or homestead), one of which (the one at goal) the speaker is a member of, and the trajectory of the action thus crosses a clearly defined social boundary defined by a social segmental contrast set.

(11) y’nawεzib
(Abaza)

'She (who lives elsewhere, or is not of my family) will give it to you (who live here, or are not of my family). ' (Allen 1956:167)
(12) d'ayyqad

(2) (Abaza)

'He (being a stranger) killed him (being my kinman).’ (Allen, 1956:169)

Interestingly, where there is a proximad, the glosses provided suggest that the action proceeds from a non-member to a member of the kingroup or the household. The speaker’s own membership is thus inferable from the use of the proximad in these examples. In (11) this membership relation is spatial or sociospatial (involving coresidence), whereas in (12) it is social (involving kinship). Both the residential and kinship inferences share a quality of being relatively noncontingent, perduring relations of “society,” as opposed to the ephemeral social relational universe of “context.” Beyond this, the two categories of relation, one relatively spatially grounded (coresidence), the other relatively autonomous from spatial considerations (kinship), are related by their conflation in the category of domesticity.

As also seen for Welsh in section 9, the extension of a sociospatial relation of residence to a purely social one of kinship is likely based on stereotypical assumptions about presupposable residence patterns in this society: Northwest Caucasian kinship groupings (such as the patronymy, lineage, the extended family, and so forth) also, under ideal (stereotypical) or real (prototypical) circumstances, delineate a taxonomically coordinate spatial category (homestead or village), and this is reflected in kinship terminology as well as in normative practice (see Benet 1974:49–54; Itoniivil 1977:99–120; Colarussi 1994:87–89). For example, among the nearby Abkhazians, the ažhualı́ ‘lineage’ is not only a purely membership category (including, under a normative idealization that affects marriage practices, for example, all those who have the same surname), but also normatively at least constitutes a territorial unity (Benet 1974:51) either coinciding with or subdividing the purely spatially based village unit, and having a spatial correlate for some domestic functions in a single shared family shrine. Below the ažhualı́ is the ažhala ‘descendants of one father’, once again a descent based grouping with a spatial correlate, which can ones again be an entire village (Benet 1974:52–53). Below this is the a-indu ‘the large house’ (extended family), which is, as the name indicates, both a descent based group (extended family) as well as a spatial grouping (homestead, a grouping of houses around a nuclear house that is specifically denoted by the term [Benet 1974:54, 106]). Just as the ažhualı́ has a spatial correlate normatively both in residence and ritual, the a-indu even more explicitly shares a common heardt that serves both as a ritual center and as the kitchen, for shared cooking and consumption of food. Clearly, the smallest kinship grouping (a-indu ‘large house’) is also the most normatively spatial, as its name suggests.

The ethnographic literature for the nearby Abaza and Circassian, synop-sized in Itoniivil (1977:106–20), shows a similar conflation of spatial (homestead) and social (kingroup) categories mediated by sociospatial (household) categories, both at the lower levels of taxonomic inclusion (the "big (extended) family" and "small (nuclear) family" as differing residential forms, often
assumed by Soviet anthropologists to be in some sort of evolutionary sequence [e.g., by Itoniśvili 1977]), as well as at the level of the lineage. The sociospatial category taxonomically superordinate to the big or small family household tended to coincide with the village community:

In the nineteenth century, the principal structural unit of social organization of the Abaza was the village community, which was designated by several denominations (in Abaza it was called kit or kuqe, but in Arabic jamāz). The smallest and principal social unit in the composition of the village community was considered to be the small individual family, parallel to which the big family continued to exist. . . . According to statistical data, the number of big families formed one third of the overall quantity of families . . . A big family dwelled in several houses located around one courtyard. [Itoniśvili 1977:117–18; my translation]

As Itoniśvili points out, the inclusive socially defined lineage tends to coincide spatially with the sociospatially defined village community. This extensional coincidence is mediated by several overlapping intensional relations, including proximity of residence, but not necessarily economic production:

Families separated from the big family subsequently retained a close relationship for several generations. Such a familial unity, into which several big and small families entered, was called in Abaza abanpara (compare Abkhaz abipara), but later the Persian term tuzum was used as an equivalent. This is a patronym, which in the second half of the nineteenth century did not constitute an independent productive-economic nucleus, but retained some element of unity—a single line of descent, exogamy, residence in a single district, prior to redistribution the communal use of lands, a common cemetery, an obligation to participate in blood vengeance, reciprocal help, and so on. [Itoniśvili 1977:119–20; my translation]

At various levels of taxonomic inclusion along a continuum defined by social (kinship) and spatial (dwelling) categories, there is a conflation mediated by sociospatial categories: the small family and the house, the big family and the homestead (consisting of several houses ranged around a courtyard, or under one roof), and the patronym (Abaza abanpara, Persian tuzum) and the village (via the village community [Abaza kit, kuqe, Arabic jamāz]).

The situation among the neighboring Circassians, both linguistically (Colarusso 1979, 1984) and socially (Itoniśvili 1977:99–105; Colarusso 1994:87–89), is much the same. As far as residential patterns are concerned, the English traveler J. A. Longworth, who made a year-long sojourn in Circassia in the late 1830s, characterized the typical Circassian hamlet of that time as follows:

The konag [host, protector] where we passed the night was a collection of a dozen or so of cottages, which we might call a village, but for the circumstance of their being tenanted by one family, or rather, the different branches of that
family, to the second and third generations, all flourishing together, and connected with the same parent stem. In the western provinces, I have never met with different families residing in the same locality... [Longworth 1840: 1:38] Clearly implied is a convergence of kinship ('one family, or rather, the different branches of that family') with residential locality. Such an empirical (token-mediated) or normative (type-mediated) convergence of autonomous fields of relationality defined by kinship and residential locality is the essence of domesticity. The linguistic situation in Circassian parallels that found in Abaza. In Circassian, the preverb qa 'hither' appears to be required when the goal of the action is first person (Colarusso 1979:39), but otherwise, as Colarusso has noted, cultural factors intervene to determine the "horizon" relevant for deixis. The simplest way of glossing these [indexical directional] proverbs is to describe them as defining a horizon of interest, lying at a variable, culturally determined distance between some central locus and a region considered as distal or other than this central zone. They appear on a verb when the action referred to takes place or originates in this distal zone... The 'hither' forms can now be readily interpreted as consisting of this horizon morpheme with the added nuance of 'into' or 'toward' this horizon, i.e., 'toward the zone within this horizon.' [Colarusso 1979:44-45] As Colarusso notes, many of the varied meanings that he has uncovered for the proximal orientation in Circassian "all rely on spatial concepts" (Colarusso 1979:50), which he regards to be originary. Nonspatial usages of various kinds he regards as being "relatively late and analogical extension of the original spatial usages" (Colarusso 1979:51). One of the most important nonspatial usages, which proves to be the most problematic for Colarusso, is an alternative grounding of this "horizon or interest" in terms of a purely social category, the "consanguineal kinship group" (Colarusso 1979:51-52) and its extensions in terms of classificatory kin, such as guests and friends: We seem to be dealing... with a horizon of interest that is determined by the consanguineal kingroup of the speaker and is quite distinct from any spatial criteria. One's blood kinsman carries one's horizon of interest with him, wherever he may roam. If one's blood kinsman murders a stranger, this is considered as an act originating within one's horizon of interest, hence no horizon prefix on the verb. If a stranger murders one's blood kinsman, then this act is considered as having originated outside one's horizon of interest. The directional suffix is essential in that it conveys the nuance that this alien action has penetrated into or has been directed against one's horizon of interest. There is evidence that not merely blood kinsmen, but certain types of close friends, those having symbolic kinship with the group, may also serve as the basis for a kingroup horizon. [Colarusso 1979:54] This leads to uses of qa 'hither' (in a manner entirely analogous to the Abaza
examples given by Allen (1956)) when the trajectory of action moves from a (third person subject) stranger or conkin to kin or friend, as in (13) and (14).

Since it is grounded in (admittedly idealized) ethnographic data, the question of ethnocentrism is less troubling.

9. From *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft* deixis in Welsh. Modern North Welsh has a nominal deictic (*acw* 'that place over there [noun]; that over there [adjective]'; *nacw* 'that one [masculine or feminine] over there [noun]'), which, in addition to those uses that are purely contingent and situational (usually accompanied by a gesture, with the referent perceptually available to one of the interlocutors), can be used to characterize an absent referent as having some perduring, noncontingent relationship of "belonging to" one, but not both, of the interlocutors (Manning 1986). These two usages are felt to be sufficiently distinct that informants frequently treat them as separate homophonous lexemes. *Acw* in the "belonging" sense does not characterize the relation between the referent and the origo in terms of spatial location or other contingencies; rather, the usage is decidedly noncontingent: all that this usage really tells us is that there is some noncontingent relationship of "belonging" between the referent and one of the participants (speaker or addressee), but not both. Thus, given the generality of the relation, we might facetiously call this form of deixis "gemeinschaft deixis" after its core distributions.

This is a perduring relation of "belonging" rather than a situationally emergent, or spatially grounded, one of "being at." This categorical divide has led to usages that are readily recognized by informants as being discrete and synchronically unrelated, the one typically glossed as 'over there' (often accompanied by an extensive gesture), the other as 'at home' (when neither the referent nor the home is visible, therefore not able to be pointed out by gesture). There can be various specific relations of belonging. The usage in (15) is spatially based and centers on the home where one currently resides. *Acw* by itself always refers to a place and has the home as its prototypical referent.

(15) y ty *acw*

the house over there

(Welsh)

'the house over there' (in the sense of 'my home, not yours' or 'your home, not mine')

Such spatially based usage can be used with other spatial categories of expanded purview (ranging from hometown to home district to country); in each case, the relation encoded is one of currently "living at" or originally "being from" the region so characterized, as illustrated in (16)-(18). In each case, the usage can be anchored to speaker ("my hometown," "my home district," or "my home country") or addressee ("your hometown," "your home district," or "your home country") origins, but not to both. All examples are taken from my field notes in modified form.
(16) **Llechfaen acw**

Llechfaen **over.there**

‘Llechfaen there’ (in the sense of ‘the town where I am from or live (but not you)’)

(17) **Ynys Môn acw**

Anglesey **over.there**

‘Anglesey there’ (in the sense of ‘the shire where I am from or live (but not you)’)

(18) **America acw**

America **over.there**

‘America there’ (in the sense of ‘the country where you are from or live (but not I)’)

The usage can also index a purely social relationship, such as “being related to” someone in a pure kinship sense. This usage tends to be restricted, however, to kin who are currently co-resident or have been at one time co-resident kin, as in (19).

(19) **y ferch acw**

the daughter **over.there**

‘The daughter there’ (in the sense of ‘my daughter, not yours’ [expectably, but not necessarily, living at home])

This “purely social” nonresidential usage can be transferred to alternate localities that generate affectively loaded membership membership categories. Thus, it is common to use **acw** when referring to people associated with one’s chapel or the building itself (where the relation is one of “being a member of” a chapel or a denomination) as in (20) and (21).

(20) **Y capel acw**

the chapel **over.there**

‘The chapel there’ (in the sense of ‘the chapel where I worship (but not you)’)

(21) **Y Seniars acw**

the dissenters **over.there**

‘The Dissenters there’ (in the sense of ‘the denomination of which I am a member (but not you)’)

We also find it used to refer to the place of work in more recent usage (the relationship is one of “where one works”), as in (22).

(22) **y ffirm acw**

the firm **over.there**

‘The firm there’ (in the sense of ‘the place where I work (but not you)’)

The abstract relation of “belonging” found in all of these usages defines a universe of referents for any given interlocutor, which might be called “bases” or “base places,” which are similar to the category of “base” in Mixtec languages.
Furthermore, in the same way as with the Northwest Caucasian languages Aboz and Circassian above, in the case of the "home" (a spatial base category) and the "family" (a social base category), the spatial warrant for use of a deictic is extended to a social warrant based on a stereotypical or prototypical conflation of spatial and social categories: the home as base defines a set of potential "at base" referents (co-residents) that under stereotypical assumptions about prototypical residence patterns, are identical to a kinship grouping (the co-resident family). This is clearly seen if we look more closely at the "at home" relation. Physical objects may be acu only if they are actually physically located at one's home (purely spatial), as illustrated in (23).

(22) By cloch eraum acu
the clock eraum over.there
'The alarm clock there' (in the sense of 'the one at my home [not yours]' )

Nonkin persons may be acu (naciw being the person deictic) only if they live with the speaker at home, but they need not actually be there at the moment of speaking, as in (24).

(34) Mrs. Morris acu
Mrs. Morris over.there
'Mrs. Morris there' (e.g., in the sense of 'my landlady [not yours]' )

This is then sociospatial, requiring coresidence as a warrant for use of acu. Close kin, notably those of the sort that might be expected to live with one for some period of their life (such as one's spouse, parents, or children) are the only persons who may be acu regardless of whether they actually do live with one or not, as illustrated in (19) above.

Here we see, on the basis of presupposables patterns of coresidence intersecting with kinship categories, an "ideological conflation" (Harris 1982; or, minimally, a conflation, whether ideal or real) of the two leading from purely spatial to purely social deixis. Each aspect of the category of residence, spatial (home or house), sociospatial (household or coresidential group), and social (co-residential family), constitutes an empirically distinguishable relation for the use of this deictic. However, the ideal conflation of these aspects under the stereotype of the coresidential family, or their actual conflation in statistically dominant prototypes, effects a transition between them. In this transition from spatial through sociospatial to social deixis we gradually relax the spatial presuppositions of the deictic, from actual location to actual cohabitation to merely presupposable cohabitation, and replace them with social presuppositions of kinds of social relation, from none (totally spatially contingent) to coresident (partially spatially contingent) to near kin (not spatially contingent). We can see strong parallels here with the Circassian and Ataza example above; indeed, what differences there are can be essentially reduced to the radically different
normative living arrangements. The idealized as well as empirical Welsh industrial town has a generationally shallow core resident family consisting typically of a married couple and their unmarried children (Manning 1995), while the ideal Northwest Caucasian "household," or hamlet, involves a homestead housing a rather more extended family, even extending to the village as a whole.

The differences found in this example of social deixis, however, have to do with the variety of different forms of social relation that warrant the use of this deixis. Thus, not merely categories of domesticity can serve as a warrant for the use of this deixtic, but also other gemeinschaft-like forms of "belonging," such as chapel or denominational membership, or mere problematically gesellschaft-like relations, such as place of work.

The Welsh example then adds to the repertoire of social relations that can be grouped under social deixis, moving us from the specific relations of domesticity to a kind of gemeinschaft-like "belonging" in general. In fact, it moves beyond these into more gesellschaft-like forms of sociability, though it appears that there is a dependence (historical, logical, or affective) between these other forms of "belonging" and the relatively typologically robust category of "domesticity." The various qualitatively different indexical fields seeded to interpret this deixtic are summarized in figure 2.

\[ \text{Deixis} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Umwelt deixis} & \quad \text{Mitwelt deixis} \\
\text{(situational deixis)} & \quad \text{(social deixis)} \\
\text{Gemeinschaft deixis} & \quad \text{Gesellschaft deixis} \\
\text{(moral 'belonging')} & \quad \text{(political-economic 'ownership')} 
\end{align*} \]

\textbf{Figure 2.} Deictic fields for the use of acw.

Since these derivative gesellschaft-like forms of social deixis are also products of history and ideology, it is not surprising that the perduring indexical relations involved change from place to place and time to time. Thus, in novelistic representations of discourse from Northeast Wales in the nineteenth century (Owen
1891), we have an "entrepreneurial" warrant for the use of *acw* with respect to lead mines. In the above cited text, the owner-manager of a local mine (Captain Trevor) uses *acw* to refer to the mine, implying not residential "belonging" but outright "ownership." In contrast, Sem Llwyd, one of his supervisors, refers to the same mine using *yno* "there", a form that does not imply ownership (Owen 1891:236).

The use of the deictic *acw* to refer to a given lead mine is distributed asymmetrically between workers, on the one hand, who do not use *acw* to refer to the mine in which they work, and owners and managers, on the other, who do use *acw* to refer to the mine that they own or manage. Here the warrant for the use of *acw* is clearly based in some way on hegemonic nineteenth-century ideas deriving from political economy of "property" as a privileged form of enduring social relationship, dividing the world asymmetrically with respect to some referent into "owners" (who use *acw* in reference) and "non-owners" (who do not).15 With this usage, the deictic *acw* moves decisively from gemeinschaft-like to gesellschaft-like nuances of "belonging," and change at the same time from being asymmetrically distributed (across all those who "belong") to being asymmetrically distributed between owners and non-owners (creating linguistic reflexes of the "haves" and "have-nots" of the relational universe of political economy—deictic reflexes of "class").

This "entrepreneurial" usage of the late nineteenth-century contrasts strikingly and suggestively with what we can call, perhaps, "professional *acw*" of late twentieth-century usage, illustrated in (22), where the place of work is treated as a shared and symmetrical relation between workers as an alternative locus of gemeinschaft-like "belonging." And, lastly, we can contrast the lead mines of nineteenth-century Flintshire (with their "entrepreneurial *acw*") with suggestive evidence from the slate quarries of nineteenth-century Caernarvonshire in the same period. The slate quarriers, in contrast to lead miners, were apparently quite liable to use *acw* to refer to their traditional work locations (so-called "bargains") in the quarry, as well as the quarry as a whole (Lloyd 1996:34). Such usage was also remarked upon by other visitors to these quarries, one of whom noted with surprise that the veteran quarriers in a given quarry "speak with as much pride and authority about 'our quarry,' as if they were extensive shareholders in the concern."16 Such a usage is suggestive of the power of ideologies to inform pragmatic usage, in that these workers notoriously considered their "bargains" as being something akin to property, morally and customarily, if not juridically (Manning forthcoming). Moreover, Liberal observers themselves at the same time seemed to see this linguistic usage as a patent and transparent contestation of "entrepreneurial" Liberal notions of exclusive property ownership—deictic reflexes of "class struggle." With this final transition, we have taken deixis finally from the situational indexical relations of the perceptual field to the social indexical relations of both of the moral and political economy. Such deixis is surely social.
10. Conclusions. Many accounts of deixis include, in addition to a discussion of temporal and spatial deixis, a discussion of what has come to be known as "social deixis" (see, e.g., Fillmore 1975; Brown and Levinson 1973). Typically, social deixis has been taken to mean systems of honorifics and other forms of nonreferential indexicality (Silverstein 1976) by which interlocutors index aspects of their social context. The examples discussed here, I would argue, have a more natural claim to this term. Deictic categories can mobilize cultural knowledge in the form of not only spatial and temporal categories, but also sociospatial and purely social categories. Moreover, the indexical relations coded by deixis are not merely these contingencies of the situation, but can include rather more perduring relations of society.

Moreover, the context relevant for deixis is not exhausted by the domain of the contingent and immediate indexical relations that arise epemerally in the speech situation or perceptual field. I have shown a number of examples of languages that either code an opposition between "contingent" and "perdurant" indexical relations differently, or have multiple deictic fields for the same deictics, one more contingent, often perceptually grounded, the other more perduring relations in perceptual absence, often centering on social relations of "domesticity," and sometimes moving beyond these to more abstractly gemeinschaft-like forms of social relationality. Therefore, following Voloshinov (1983:12-13), we must countenance a cline of indexical relations from the purely contingent to the absolutely perduring, from the immediacy of the umwelt to the mediacy of the mitwelt. Since languages in their coding seem to draw rather a strong line between the contingencies of the situation and the perduring relations of society, the received phenomenological account of deixis, which has axiomatized the former form of indexical relation as foundational, must be somehow extended to cover these data if we are to have an account that is not episodic or eclectic. I have attempted to find a way of characterizing this difference in terms of Schütz’s phenomenology by identifying, in addition to the purely formally identifiable relations of "consociate" in the umwelt and "contemporary" in the mitwelt, an intermediate category of phenomenally impure, partially idealized relations, which are constituted by iterations of pure umwelt experiences along with idealizations of future restorability, experienced polythetically, but grasped monolithically. Ironically, as noted above, these are precisely the sorts of relations for which much current anthropology tends to utilize Schütz’s term "consociate." In concrete terms, these relations center cross-culturally and cross-linguistically on relations of domesticity (the "belonging" of kinship and co-residence), but in the case of Welsh can be expanded with important differences to alternative loci of gemeinschaft-like belonging (chapels, membership, for example) to include, for example, more gesellschafts-like relations defined by wage labor (place of work) or property ownership ("belonging" in the juridical, rather than moral, sense).

These forms of deixis are "social" in yet another sense. In a set of transitions
that mirrors this transition from contingent to perduring, the primordial relation of "actual location" of the referent in relation to the origo that is often assumed to exhaust the spatial relativity of deixis must in some instances be supplemented by less contingent, but nevertheless ultimately spatially grounded, sociospatial relations of "living at," "being from," or "working at." The paradigm exemplar of the domain where we encounter these transitions is the social sphere of the domestic, where social categories of kinship are routinely conflated in lived experience as well as idealization with sociospatial categories of residence, mediated by purely spatial categories (the house itself). But the sociality of deixis is not limited to the home; such sociospatial forms of deixis can be further attuned to purely social forms of gemeinschaft-like "belonging," such as "being a member of" a family or a chapel or "being related to" someone in some specifiable kin universe. Such forms of deixis are closely social, though in each case a relevant or parallel spatial grouping is implied. If we are to call anything "social deixis," it should be this. By investigating such problematic forms of deixis, and insisting that they must be brought under a unified account, I hope not only to have rendered the existing phenomenologically based account of deixis more adequate to the empirical phenomena, but also to have shown that deixis (and a fortiori indexicality) is not merely a creature of the context of situation, but can have relevance to the broader transnational context of "society."

Notes

Acknowledgments. Different forms and portions of this article have been presented at different times and places. Without listing these, I would like to thank all those who discussed these ideas with me over the various embodiments of this article. In particular, I would like to thank John Colarusso, Amy Duhlstrom, William Hanf, John Haviland, Michael Silverstein, Rupert Stasch, Darriel Seelak, and Hylton White, among many others, for contributing to my thinking on this topic, as well as the two anonymous reviewers provided by Anthropological Linguistics. I would like to thank Linda Behzad for being "there" along the way. I would also like to thank Dylan Morgan and his family and friends for their endless patience and hospitality, without which I could never have begun this paper. Errors are my own.

Abbreviations. The following abbreviations are used: A = adverbial case; ABS = absolutive case; ADSS = adessive; D = dative case; EPS = ergative case; G = genitive case; INSTR = instrumental case; N = nominative case; OBL = oblique case; PL = plural; THV = thematic vowel; TR = transitive.

1. This bifurcation of deixis into "duplices signa" (Jakobsson 1971) is a point of agreement between the two major traditions for the study of deixis, the phenomenological tradition of Bühler and the semantic tradition of Piero. Both of these authors agree that deixis stands at the juncture of two distinct semiotic orders — what I call from now on the "indexical" (pragmatic) and the denotational (semantic), hence, deixis are "indexical denotational." (Silverstein 1976). For Bühler (1990), words such as here and there stand at the juncture of the symbolic field and the deictic field, in that they simultaneously characterize a referent denotationally (these words both denote places) in a manner that is relatively invariant across contexts ("semantic" meaning), and
possess "field values" accruing from the deictic field ("pragmatic" meaning), so that there is "proximal to the deictic origin," and there is "distal to the deictic origin." For Pierce, deictics are also indexical "signs" (in terms of their "representamen" (sign vehicle)) by virtue of being abstract types (a "general law") that are part of a normative grammar (Saussurean "language," a system of "signs") that replicate themselves through "sign" (Saussurean "parole," individual "real" tokens of these types: "an actual existent thing or event") (Mertz 1985:3). More importantly, deictics are also indexical "symbols" (in terms of their "ground," the relation between sign vehicle and object by which the sign vehicle represents the object) by virtue of the fact that they characterize their referent "symbolically," that is, by virtue of a general law (transcontextual "semantic" meaning), and at the same time by being meaningful indexically, that is, by virtue of some sort of contiguity or real connection with their referent in a given context of utterance ("pragmatic" meaning) (Mertz 1985:3-4).

2. Turner's characterization of these trends in the anthropological treatment of embodiment in its larger theoretical and social context (Turner 1994, 1999) invites a comparison to what Adorno (1973) called a "jargon of authenticity" (with reference to earlier Heideggerian phenomenology, to which many of these newer theories [particularly Duranti 1997] are indebted directly or indirectly). However laudable the intent of many such theories (old and new) to salvage a moment of authentic subjective freedom and agency from the determinations of objective structures, Adorno argues, in a manner that broadly parallels Turner's arguments, that "these empty claims for freedom" can act to conceal, or mystify the "objective context of unfreedom" represented, for example, by "the socioeconomic processes of advanced capitalist integration" (Schroyer 1973:xxiv). One notes that the phenomenological trend in linguistic anthropology (like the broader "postmodern" or "poststructuralist" trends) is the human sciences to which it is related (Duranti 1997:43) utilizes a similar "jargon" emphasizing agency, embodiment, presence, participation, and immediacy. The immediate theoretical effects of this are similar to those found in the broader trend (notably the obsession or epiphenomenalization of a trans-situational social order [cf. Bauman and Briggs 1990:67; Hanks 1996:11-14; Turner 1994:29]), but additional dangers arise from unconsciously assimilating terms like "indexical" into this "jargon" as a mere equivalent for "interactive" (as, e.g., Goodein and Duranti 1996:44). Part of the goal of this article is to show that the "social" order, like the "interaction order" (Goffman 1983), is also an indexical order. The question then becomes how to characterize the specific differences between these orders.

3. The move from a view of the "body as an inert and passive object" to an emphasis on "subjective embodiment" (Turner 1995; Orta 1999:867) directly parallels the change in view of context as static backdrop of interaction to context as creatively shaped by interaction (Goodwin and Duranti 1999:31).

4. For reflections on this problem from within these perspectives, see the articles collected in Boden and Zimmerman (1991), for uaside critiques, see, for example, Williams (1995) and Bourdieu (1983:312).

5. Of course, there have been attempts to redress the lack of "articulation" of situation and society (e.g., Boden and Zimmerman 1991).
7. An anonymous reviewer has objected that my critique of what I have called (and what are often self-styled) "phenomenological" accounts seems to confuse several different features, for example, radical empiricism along with methodological individualism. I readily admit that this is so, but in many cases the situation is present in the theories themselves. For instance, radical empiricism (including a definite tendency towards methodological purism) is certainly combined with methodological individualism in conversation analysis and in its antecedents, notoriously in ethnomethodology (for reasons that may be, in fact, principled in terms of the theory [Williams 1992]). The radical reading of the Vichian verum-factum principle (on which, see, e.g., Jay [184-34-35]) implied in the very term "ethnomethodology" suggests that methodological and substantive arguments are not easily separated (see Schegloff [1981] for a programmatic statement). Ethnomethodology maintains that the stable, rational, intelligible, reasonable, understandable, justifiable features (verum) are a practical and continuous accomplishment of members throughout the course of their daily life (factum) ([Williams 1992: 156; Vichian intepretations in square brackets are mine]). Those branches of linguistic anthropology that show a heavy influence from phenomenologically based theories like ethnomethodology and conversation analysis may or may not show a similar confusion. My metoretical goal has been to locate the problem of deixis in a broader, admittedly idealized, act of theoretical tendencies, which will, therefore, be unevenly distributed across actual individuals.

8. An anonymous reviewer has questioned my categorical opposition (derived from Voloshinov [1983]) but parallels are also found in phenomenologists like Schutz) between situation and society, arguing that this "simple opposition" must be "overcome." I quote agree, but I have utilized this opposition rhetorically as a way of "bringing society back in" as a methodologically autonomous entity in the face of phenomenological accounts that often either ignore it or seek to reduce it methodologically to an epiphenomenal product of situations. Moreover, this opposition is itself drawn from this same phenomenological tradition. As I hope is obvious, I do not believe that this is in fact a simple opposition, and my intent has been to reconcile these two antinomic methodological tendencies (situation and society), which cannot be done solely by placing them on a continuum. The phenomenological theories that I critique here seek to show minimally that the situation has autonomous immanent properties separate from those imputed analytically to constructs like society (Goffman's work is exemplary of this trend [e.g., Goffman 1986, 1980]). If this is so, then methodologically speaking, it is useful and principled to maintain a categorical distinction between "situation" and whatever is not "situation" (society), and it would be unprincipled eclecticism to treat this antinomy (which is, after all, real in its methodological consequences) as an artifactual dualism. What I primarily dislike about phenomenological accounts is the one-sidedness of their views, which move from a laudable championship of the methodologically immanent properties of the perceptually immediate indexical order (situation) to an often somewhat extreme but nonetheless implicit lack of attention to methodologically (perceptually) transcendent determination from a relatively perduring indexical order (society), what Goffman termed "rampant situationalism" (Goffman 1983:4). My objective here is to develop a specifically phenomenological vocabulary to conceptualize the latter that does not do so simply by reducing it to the former, or by blinding the very real differences between the two indexical orders.

Moreover, the current generation of phenomenologists within linguistic anthropology seek to ground themselves intellectually in forebears who were themselves more balanced with respect to this opposition. Although Voloshinov is frequently associated in linguistic anthropology with pioneering situationalists and interactionists approaches to language (Goodwin and Duranti 1992:12; Hanks 1996:143), a fuller view of his work shows that he delineates a quasi-categorical boundary between "occasional" deter-
ominations of the utterance arising from the "immediate social situation" and the "deeper layers" determined by the "more sustained and more basic social connections with which the speaker is in contact" (the "broader social milieu") (Voloshinov 1973:87). Similarly, part of the problem with the more recent appropriation of phenomenology in linguistic anthropology is one-sided readings that emphasize the voluntarist and situationist aspects of the work of these authors (Voloshinov's "situation" (Goodwin and Duranti 1992:19); Schutz's "unselbst" (Duranti 1995:22); Merleau-Ponty's corporeal perceptual field (Hanks 1996:327-28; Duranti 1997:250), while neglecting the opposed and complemen-
tary terms with reference to which they are defined (respectively, left unmentioned in the above contexts) are Voloshinov's "milieu"; Schutz's "unselbst"; Merleau-Ponty's "institutions" (Merleau-Ponty 1973:44) and "history" (Merleau-Ponty 1962:448), there-
by exchanging originally relational terms for non-relational ones. This partiality of em-
phasis is surely intended to draw attention to the novelty of the theoretical contributions of
these thinkers, who, indeed, are among the first to draw our attention to the
immanent properties of phenomenal situation. For Voloshinov, the problem is further
complicated by a tendency to assimilate his position, and the authorship of his writings,
to that of Mikhail Bakhtin (however equivocally; see, e.g., Duranti and Goodwin 1992:23
n.11); Hill (1996:222 n.1). For an excellent discussion of Voloshinov in relation to
Bakhtin, as well as a persuasive argument for their nonidentity, see Morson and

9. An anonymous reviewer has objected that I seem to be implying that many of the
theorists that I engage are radically situationist in the sense that they lack any notion of
perduing sociocultural categories, and specifically objects to the implication that such a
view is attributable to such authors as Hanks and Silverstein (to whom it clearly does not
apply). I believe this to be a misunderstanding of my claim on both counts. Naturally,
many if not most of the theories of deixis that I have mentioned have considered the way
in which perduring cultural knowledge (a fact of the "broader milieu") is mobilized
situationally in the interpretation of deixis (see, in particular, Hanks 1996; Silverstein
1993). I address these in my discussion of "segmentary shifters." Even conversation
analysts have some notion of culture, and language, as a set of situationally tran-
sendent perduring typifications that are used to construct situations, notably "mastery
of natural language," constructed rather broadly to include "indigenous frameworks of
commonsense knowledge" (Goodwin and Duranti 1992:28). However, to the extent that
phenomenologically based linguistic anthropology aligns itself with those "functionalist"
paradigms of linguistic theory associated with "emergent grammar" (Hopper 1987), then
even this perduring order of Saussurean "langue" would be reduced to yet another token-
level indexical order. That is not my point. As I make clear, there are certain kinds
of indexical relations constitutive of what I call social deixis, which, unlike situational
indexical relations such as proximity, visibility, and so forth, are indexical, and yet not
situationality (I have in mind perduring social relations like kinship, co-residence, employ-
ment, property, and so on). It is precisely these forms of perduring indexical relations,
indexing social, rather than situational, relations, that call for a revision of existing
theories of deixis. The central difference then is the difference between situationally
transcendent typifications (culture) and situationally transcendent indexical relations
(social relations) that can only be grasped longitudinally, if at all. Ethnomet hodologically
inspired accounts seem to be more content to accept perduring transnational orders of
an "ideal" nature (cultures and grammars conceived of as orders of ideal types) than to
accept those that are "real" (society conceived of as an order of perduring indexical
relations). Here I leave aside the question of whether certain kinds of situationally
transcendent indexical orders (such as that created and sustained by advanced capital-
ism) can be grasped at all in terms of a typifying cultural "ratio" (Adorno 1974:244).

10. The opposition between intensification and extension as used here refers to the
opposition between sets viewed as types versus sets viewed as tokens. Indecisual relations are token order or extensional relations between individual particulars, innocent of qualitative distinctions. Conventional typifying relations that organize these particulars as tokens of types are by nature based on a different, non-indecisual order of relation.

11. I owe my terminological distinction here and portions of the specific phrasing to Michael Silverstein (p.c. 1984).

12. This criterion identifies it precisely with Goffman's "social situation" (as well as with Goffman's "interaction order" [Goffman 1983:2]), which is similarly constituted in and by the embodied perceptual field of the interlocutors:

I would define a social situation as an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities, anywhere within which an individual will find himself accessible to the naked senses of all others who are "present," and similarly find them accessible to him. According to this definition, a social situation arises whenever two or more individuals find themselves in one another's immediate presence, and lasts until the next-to-last person leaves. [Goffman 1964:135]

13. Note that in much contemporary anthropology the term "consoicate" (even in those authors who explicitly cite Schütz) is used in this impure sense (that is, a perduration relation that partakes both of umwel and mitwel experiences) rather than in the purely formal sense of "social relationship corresponding to the umwel" intended by Schütz (e.g., Munn 1986:6; Hanks 1996:32-33; Errington 1998:71). All of these authors, it should be noted, explicitly treat the immediate indexical relation (consoicate proper) as foundational to the impure "derivative" perduring indexical relation ("consoicate"), which could be treated in effect as a recursive application of the umwel versus mitwel opposition to the mitwel.

14. It is noteworthy that Colaruso provides for the fact that certain sorts of classificatory kin, in particular, guests, fall within the same "horizon" of consanguineal and coresidential deixis in Circassian. The fact that traditional Circassian homesteads of the nineteenth century provided a specialized spatial structure gives the category of "guest" a residential aspect. The durable interconnections between social and spatial groupings extend, therefore, to the provision of a guest house, usually located peripherally to the homestead, which is canonically grouped around an enclosure or green (Bell 1840:1:321-22). For a nineteenth-century noble (pâs, pise), whose retainers might also reside with him, these guest buildings might be larger in number though still peripheral (Spencer 1859:2:190-91). Russian sources from the same period show similar dispositions of family houses within the enclosed yard and guest houses outside of it, possibly "diagramming" (acting as an indexical icon of) the social relations of kin (central) and nonkin (peripheral) spatially (Iomiishvili 1977:103-4).

15. This liberal notion of "property" describes a perduring indexical relation, like the other gemeinschaft-like uses for social relations that this deictic-encompasses, in contrast to mere possession, which involves a rather more situational than social form of indexicality: "What distinguishes property from mere momentary possession is that property is a claim that will be enforced by society or the state, by custom or convention or law. If there were not this distinction there would be no need for a concept of property: no other concept than mere occupancy or momentary physical possession would be needed" (Macpherson 1978:3 emphasis mine). Nevertheless, many ideologies of property from Locke forward (but not, for instance, Bentham) seek to ground the conventional typifying relation of perduring "ownership" in some form of direct immediate indexical relation deriving from an originary act of appropriation (e.g., Locke's "mixture of labor"), thus semiotically grounding the social form of indexicality (property) in the situational form (possession).
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